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Foucault and Social Measure
Mary Beth Mader
Michel Foucault’s arguments for the importance of  the modern social
technology of  the norm have received much scholarly attention. But
in most cases a philosophical explication of  the supposed novelty of
the norm on the level of  its very basic conceptual operation is lacking.
This paper offers analysis of  and speculation on the conceptual
operation of  statistical measure as a part of  the political technology of
biopower. It further aims to examine the ontological dimension of  the
social technology of  the norm and of  social statistical measure. Its
starting point, then, is Foucault’s underexploited insight into the
specificity of  normalization as a central and novel element of  the
mutation in power that he calls “modern biopower.”
The paper is not a work in statistical theory or in the history
of  statistics; it seeks rather to articulate the conceptual level of  the
operation of  normalization through a focus on the operation of
statistical measurement as found in the normal curve and other like
instruments of  social statistics. It proposes that in order to sense fully
the novelty and centrality of  normalizing techniques, attention must
be paid to the specific nature of  statistical measurement. It is by such
attention that we can seize the specificity and novelty of  the continuous
nature of  the new power over life that Foucault analyzes. In particular,
this attention helps to distinguish the norm from a law and from a rule,
custom, or tradition.
The paper attempts several things: part one argues for the
importance to Foucault’s account of  biopower of  a statistical conception
of  the norm and of  its role in the constitution of  the continuities that
characterize that form of  power. A full conceptual analysis of  the
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complex technology that is the normal curve is precluded here for
reasons of  space. But part two seeks to apply the point about the
importance of  the norm in the creation of  continuities to a simpler
statistical notion implicitly included in the norm, namely, the ratio. It
then extends Foucault’s argument to speculate that numerical
continuities expressed in the ratios of  social measure can obscure both
ontological discontinuities and social relations.
Many of the criticisms of the statistical constitution of social
continuities that are advanced in part two are not unprecedented in
themselves. Indeed, some commentators have critiqued the roles of
statistics in state administration, law and the social sciences as
illegitimately homogenizing operations from the very time of  their
historical emergence.1 The purpose of  introducing these criticisms into
discussion of  Foucault’s work is to shed light on Foucault’s own thought,
and to extract and amplify his epistemic claims about the operation of
statistical tools in the crafting of  continuities.
I. Measures of  life: biopower and statistics in the work of
Foucault
A normalizing society is the historical outcome of  a
technology of  power centered on life2
Foucault extends Georges Canguilhem’s largely biomedical,
partially statistical, and marginally social accounts of  normativity and
normalization into a technopolitics that lends great significance to the
role of  the statistical norm.3 He argues that the emergence of
normalizing practices characterizes the age of  modern biopower,
distinguishing this kind of  power from the sovereign power of  the
previous age.4 On this well-known account, two forms of  biopower
develop since the seventeenth century. These two forms are (i) an
anatomo-politics of  the human body, and (ii) a bio-politics of
population. The first form Foucault identifies with the disciplinary
practices perfected in armies, schools and factories. The second form
he identifies with the regulatory controls of  state administrations and
their knowledge-producing bodies.5 According to Foucault, one of  the
characteristic features of  biopower is the continuous nature of  its
application, in comparison to the discontinuous nature of  sovereign
power. But what is the nature and source of  the continuity or continuities
that are relevant to biopower? The suggestion offered in this paper is
that the continuities posited or created in statistical measurement are a
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source and support of  the social continuities imposed in social
standardization. To understand Foucault’s account of  normalization
as a crucial component of  biopower, then, it will be useful to consider
some of  the basic conceptual components of  the statistical notion of
the normal curve, such as the mean or average, and the ratio.
In statistics, the normal distribution, or normal curve, has been
interpreted in varying ways over the course of  its history. It is sometimes
called the Gaussian error law because of  its origin as a technique for
the correction of  measurement in the physical sciences. It is also called
the “Bell Curve” because of  its characteristic shape. Its minimal
description must include the two notions of  mean and dispersion. In
its social scientific employment, it is a graphic representation of  the
distribution of  frequencies of  values for a given measured property,
with the most frequent values being those in the distribution that cluster
around a mean or average in a single peak.6
One common objection to the use of the statistical notion of
the norm is that since its use often vacillates between a descriptive and
a normative sense it is fallaciously equivocal.  This is so, and we will see
that Foucault has a fruitful insight about this duality. But the paper
aims to show that there are grounds for supplementary concerns about
the nature of  statistical social measure. These concerns are of  two
sorts. The first is that significant instances of  covert equivocation and
tacit amalgams occur on the very level of  the statistical concepts of
mean and ratio. That is, the paper suggests that statistical social
measurement is ontologically problematic on the very level of  the
conceptual composites expressed in statistical measures and distributions
and not only on an allegedly duplicitous subsequent prescriptive
application of  an allegedly-descriptive conceptual instrument.
The second is that the character of  lived experience in the age
of  biopower is conditioned by the statistical panopticism that the new
statistical tools permit. Attention to the refined level of  the
“microphysics” of  biopower reveals a mathematics of  measurement
that yields the possibility for bodies to be lived as fundamentally comparative
on the level of  the life of  the body and the life of  the population and
species. Relative to previous periods dominated by the binarizing
function of  legal prohibition, a new kind of  comparability emerges,
according to Foucault. That is, the kind of  comparability available to
and characteristic of  bodies and groups changes with the advent of
the modern statistical notion of  a normal distribution.
The proposal advanced is that it is the continuous nature of
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some statistical distributions, and the statistical use of  basic mathematical
notions such as the ratio and the average, that ground the continuity of
both individuals and collectivities in Foucault’s account of  modern
biopower. That is, the mathematical notion of  continuous magnitude
replaces the notion of  analogy as the operative concept that
homogenizes relations of  individuals to larger social unities. With the
spread of the statistics of population and their role in the constitution
of  subjects, then, social relations literally become rationalized, or more
precisely, ratio-ized. More precisely, one can trace a genealogy of  the
transitions, first, from a statistics of  qualitative description, then, to a
statistics of  elementary two-dimensional quantitative comparison and,
finally, to the ampler multidimensional quantitative comparative
technology of  statistical distributions. This means that the life of  bodies
and populations is ratio-ized in finer and finer ways, with increasing
possibilities for inter-comparison.
To begin to establish these points, attention must be paid to
evidence of  Foucault’s thought on the norm in the statistical sense.
Accordingly, what follows are indications of  the import of  this statistical
theme in select texts: Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974-
1975,7 Discipline and Punish: The Birth of  the Prison,8 The History of  Sexuality,
Volume I, and Sécurité, Territoire, Population: Cours au Collège de France. 1977-
1978.9 Mentions of  techniques of  quantification as instances of  “social
control” found in “disciplinary societies” are not infrequent in these
texts. Only some of  the most salient instances are included here.10
Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974-1975
In the context of  an analysis of  the relations between
nineteenth-century legal and medical institutions, Foucault argues that
certain notions, notably those of  perversity and danger, help to join
the two types of  institutions. The notion of  perversion allows the
meshing of  legal and medical concepts and the notion of  danger permits
exchanges and collaborations between legal and medical institutions.
Foucault describes the articulation of  these concepts and institutions
onto each other as the production of  a kind of  continuity: these linking
notions install a “protective continuum” that combines criminal offense
with medical abnormality. Linking notions of  this kind are described
as “switch points” or échangeurs that allow legal and medical notions to
enter and operate in each other’s domains. Interestingly, Foucault
identifies the operative strength of  these switch points with their
epistemological fragility. About this sort of  operative conceptual and
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institutional switch point, he writes: “the weaker it is epistemologically,
the better it functions.”11 For the medico-legal opinion that arises on
the basis of  this notional articulation is inconsistent with the “terms . .
. norms . . . and formation rules” of  both the fields of  law and medicine.12
One of  the key conceptual marks of  this new category of
medico-legal expertise is precisely that of  continuity. Here, we find
Foucault’s repeated identification of  one of  the novel features of
modern biopower, in this case its disciplinary version: a gradational
ontology replaces one of  opposition. “Expert medico-legal opinion is
not deployed in a field of  opposition, but in a field of  gradation from
the normal to the abnormal.”13
Foucault contrasts two forms of  social control in the West,
one that works by exclusion and another that works by inclusion. The
first casts out individuals, creating two masses of  people that are
strangers to each other, as is the case with the exclusion of  lepers in the
Middle Ages. This characteristically medieval form of  social control is
aimed at purification of  the community and its practice extends into
the start of  the eighteenth century.  At that point, the second form of
social control replaces the exclusionary form. This form is actually an
eighteenth century re-emergence, Foucault claims, of  another medieval
form of  social control. This second form is based on the social
technologies of  monitoring and registering that was devised for the
management of  plagues. It requires constant surveillance and registering
of  the conditions of  individuals in a population struck by plague. The
power correlative to this newly re-operative form of  social control is
“continuous in two senses.”14  There is (i) an organizational, structural
continuity and there is (ii) a temporal continuity of  surveillance. That
is, the town is sectioned into spatial units of  varying levels of  size,
within a general topographical grid, and inspectors and agents of  political
power per se are assigned to these sections. But, further, time is likewise
sectioned and assigned such that inspectors can create registers that
record the residents’ conditions at established regular intervals.
This inclusive form of  social control works by
individualization: “there is a series of  fine and constantly observed
differences between individuals who are ill and those who are not.  It is
a question of  individualization; the division and subdivision of  power
extending to the fine grain of  individuality.”15 This is a point at which
to see Foucault’s frequent claim that biopower is productive, and to
grasp the relation between this productivity and the multiplication of
epistemologically refined specification techniques for the control and
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comparability of  individuals.  The Classical Age invents “a power that
does not act by separating into large confused masses, but by distributing
according to differential individualities.”16  Hence, Foucault holds that
“the norm brings with it a principle of  both qualification and
correction.” That is, a central part of  the uniqueness of  normalization,
as opposed to prior exclusive forms of  power, is that it controls precisely
by qualifying, but by qualifying bodies with quantifiable qualities. By
endowing bodies with measurable features, it installs the conceptual
basis for their control and management.
In the exclusive form of  social control, the excluded group is
juridically and politically “disqualified.”17 But one might add that it is
also, importantly, not qualified in the sense that its members are not
classified according to a rigorous, refined and internally-gradated
taxonomy; they are not endowed with quantifiable qualities. The story
of  an individual’s inclusion, then, will in part be the tale of  their
qualification in this latter sense. That is, their quantifiable comparability,
and hence both their individualization and their differentiation, will
permit their control by the method of  inclusion. Those controlled by
inclusion will be qualified by means of  conceptual techniques that
quantify. The kind of  refined qualification that will allow both their
knowability and their correction or control crucially relies upon
quantification. Most importantly in the view proposed here, it will
depend upon the continuities—institutional, technical, conceptual,
pragmatic—that are implied by the mathematical continuity inherent
in the quantifying methods deployed by states in the emerging practice
of  “statistics.”18
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of  the Prison
This book includes particularly useful evidence of  Foucault’s
view that it is the production of  continuities that makes normalization
a novel form of  social power. Toward the end of  the book, Foucault
describes the heterogeneous generalization—from “delinquent” youth
to “the entire social body”19—of  a carceral form of  disciplinary
normalization first found in quasi-penal institutions. In this account of
the generalization of  the carceral form, Foucault emphasizes the
constitution of  multiple forms of  continuities, across previous social
divisions and discontinuities. One of  the crucial actual conditions for
this generalization is the fact that incarceration “functioned . . . according
to a principle of  relative continuity.”20 What he describes here is the
making of  a society in which deviation and infraction become
FOUCAULT AND SOCIAL MEASURE
7
interconvertible, a society that placed a binary system of  offense against
the law into communication with a distributive system of  departure
from a norm. This society crafted continuities on the level of  institutions,
punitive mechanisms, administrative procedures; it created a smooth
series of  penalties that extended from mere deviations from a norm to
infractions of  a law.21 For Foucault, it is this grand confection of  a
gradational social space that is the distinctive character of  modern
biopower. Far from a view in which modernity is characterized by its
increased social fragmentation relative to premodern life, Foucault
proposes an alternative picture in which modernity sees the achievement
of  a vast project of  social linkage and homogenization. As Foucault
writes, about the carceral network: “This vast mechanism established a
slow, continuous, imperceptible gradation that made it possible to pass
naturally from disorder to offense and in the opposite direction from a
transgression of  the law to a slight departure [écart] from a rule, an
average, a demand, a norm.”22
So, the crucial component of  this homogenization is the social
technology of  the norm. For it is the notion of  a norm and its deviations,
rather than a law and its infraction, that permits the calibration,
correction, gauging, and management that is central to biopower. The
notion of  the norm is what permits power to assume a therapeutic
guise. For if  the lawbreaker and the law-follower can be situated on a
continuum of  lawful conduct, the corrigibility of  the lawbreaker, and
the fragility of  the law-follower, come into sight. After all, what separates
them but a mere threshold degree of  one same substance, lawfulness
of  conduct? In this way, the discrete difference between lawbreaker
and law-follower is overcome in the linear continuity of  the new
gradational technology of  the norm.
The norm, then, functions within the carceral system, as the
standard to which discipline must mold bodies, as in the punitive-
corrective prison. But the continuity that characterizes the norm also
operates to create a gradation between explicitly carceral and supposedly
non-carceral practices of  discipline. It is this gradation that makes prison
acceptable.
In the subtle gradation of  the apparatuses of  discipline
and of  the successive ‘embeddings’ that they involve, the
prison does not at all represent the unleashing of  a
different kind of  power, but simply an additional degree
in the intensity of  a mechanism that has continued to
operate since the earliest forms of  legal punishment.23
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It is as if  the gradational power of  the norm itself  escapes its
limited confines and begins to function as a ubiquitous social adhesive,
creating passageways of  numerical continuity between previously
isolated cells of  society, adjoining in administrators’ statistical tables
individuals with no lived contact. But it is not merely a matter of  the
fantastical approximations of  figures in bureaucratic registers. For the
purchase of  biopower on the mass phenomena that are some of  its
objects occurs in its grasp and crafting of  social and bodily
approximations.
Foucault’s treatment of  the question of  the descriptive or
prescriptive status of  the norm is especially important for understanding
his claims about the modern conjunction of  power and knowledge.
Many commentators on the notion of  norm note that it has both a
descriptive and a prescriptive sense. Some, like Guillaume LeBlanc,
find this worrying and duplicitous; others, like Stephen Stigler, seem to
consider it innocent and trifling.24 The brilliance of  Foucault’s account
of  the norm, partially adopted in LeBlanc’s thought, is that he refuses
the common separation of  the norm into these two senses or sorts,
descriptive and prescriptive. He writes:  “With this new economy of
power, the carceral system, which is its basic instrument, permitted the
emergence of  a new form of  ‘law’: a mixture of  legality and nature,
prescription and constitution, the norm.”25
Foucault’s insight is that it is intrinsic to this new notion of
‘law,’ that is, to the norm, that it combine prescription and description.
It is not that to avoid error or confusion we must separate the two
senses and simply attend with care to which sense operates at any given
point. In fact, analyzing the norm into two separate kinds of  norm
misses the effective nature of  this new hybrid invention for social
control; it is precisely through this joining that this notion operates
most powerfully. To insist on sharply distinguishing the two kinds of
norm and to hold that failures of  the application of  the notion of  the
norm can be prevented by attention to their distinction is to radically
mistake the collaboration of  the two senses that is most proper and
necessary to the norm, and which accounts for its pervasive and palatable
force.
The History of  Sexuality, Volume I
In the context of  his discussion of  the roots of  modern
biopower, Foucault claims that quantitative approaches to sexuality
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appear at the start of  the 18th century. He writes that in this period:
there emerged a political, economic, and technical
incitement to talk about sex. And not so much in the
form of  a general theory of  sexuality as in the form of
analysis, stocktaking [comptabilité], classification, and
specification, of  quantitative or causal studies.26
For Foucault, this is part of  the birth of  a rational discourse on sex, an
element of the explosion of “talk” on the topic of sexuality that speaks
of  it as something that must be managed, made useful, regulated for
the general welfare, and optimized. He writes that it becomes a matter
of  “not the repression of  disorder, but an ordered maximization of
collective and individual forces.”27 One of  Foucault’s chief  examples
of  this is the eighteenth-century emergence of  “population as an
economic and political problem.”28 Here Foucault explicitly mentions
statistical objects: “birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, state
of  health, frequency of  illnesses, patterns of  diet and habitation.”
“These variables” are at the intersection of  “the characteristic
movements of  life” and the “particular effects of  institutions.”29
Most important to the argument of  this paper is a passage
that treats the distinction between law and norm. Foucault writes:
The law always refers to the sword.  But a power whose
task is to take charge of  life needs continuous regulatory and
corrective mechanisms. It is no longer a matter of  bringing
death into play in the field of  sovereignty, but of  distributing
the living [being] in the domain of  value and utility. Such
a power has to qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize,
rather than display itself  in its murderous splendor; it does
not have to draw the line that separates the enemies of
the sovereign from his obedient subjects; it effects distributions
around the norm.30
Here, it could not be clearer that the notion of  norm at issue is, or is
based upon, the statistical sense of  a norm as the mean of  a normal
curve. This quote would tend to disconfirm interpretations of  the notion
of  norm in Foucault that would identify it strictly either with a
generalized notion of  pre- or extra-legal prescription (Kelsen) or with
a purely biological notion of  normativity as the power of  an organism
to create new norms for itself  (Canguilhem). Law breaks a citizenry
into obedient and disobedient subjects.31 But the norm has a refined,
multiplied classification scheme that operates on a scalar model. It is
no longer a matter of  a binary division; degrees of  the measured feature
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function to locate individuals along a fundamentally uninterrupted line,
which yet can accommodate numerous categorial divisions. Their
inclusion in a statistical distribution permits pure inter-comparison of
each to each and each to all.
This emphasis on the statistical sense of  a norm likewise reveals
how Foucault’s understanding of  a norm would distinguish it from a
custom or a tradition. For neither of  these seems to imply this pure
comparability of persons or features obtained with their inclusion in a
statistical distribution. (Nor, some would add, do they carry with them
an implicit potential guide for correction or the potential for prescriptive
use.) The norm in this sense is immanently self-referential; no genealogy,
history, ancestry or external standard matters for determining it. The
norm purports to register whatever is the case at any given sampling
point. It does not appeal to an external standard in this descriptive
sense. We will see, though, that the matter is more complicated than
this and that there are other construals and uses of  the normal curve.
Sécurité, Territoire, Population: Cours au Collège de France. 1977-
1978
Foucault’s awareness of  and interest in the role of  statistical
practices and knowledge is also confirmed in Sécurité, Territoire, Population:
Cours au Collège de France. 1977-1978. In the lecture of  February 1, 1978,
Foucault proposes that the seventeenth century art of  government
was not simply a matter of  theoretical elaboration in works of  political
thought. He writes about this art, rather, that:
One can observe its correlations in the [order of  the] real
. . . it was also tied to an entire set of  analyses and [kinds
of] knowledge that were developed since the end of  the
sixteenth century and which attained their full scope in
the seventeenth century, essentially that knowledge of  the
State in its diverse facts, in its differing dimensions, in the
different factors of  its power, and this is exactly what one
called ‘statistics,’ as the science of  the State.32
Foucault also clearly distinguishes his thought from the kind of  legal
thought, specifically that of  Kelsen’s positivist legal theory of  norms,
which proposes that systems of  law necessarily repose on a fundamental
system of  norms. He specifies that his own thought concerns, rather,
how “techniques of  normalization” develop “from, beneath, in the
margins of  and perhaps even contrary to a system of  law.”33
In this text, there are in fact two modes of  normalization
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identified, corresponding to the “two basic forms” of  biopower: (i)
the disciplines and (ii) regulatory controls.34 Here, Foucault reserves
the term normation for the norm found in disciplinary techniques used
for the training of  students, workers and soldiers. In such cases, a norm
or standard is effected, is put into operation, in the very practices of
training the bodies of  these people. He writes:
Disciplinary normalization consists in first setting a model,
an optimal model that is devised in light of  a certain result,
and the operation of  disciplinary normalization consists
in try to make people, gestures, acts match this model,
the normal being precisely what is capable of  conforming
to the norm, and the abnormal what is not capable of
this.35
In the case of  the disciplines, then, that is, with normation, the norm or
model comes first, and the division into normal and abnormal follows.
We also find here one of  the clearest and most extended
discussions to be found in Foucault’s published writings of  that other
form of  normalisation, namely, the kind that characterizes regulatory
controls. This discussion takes place essentially in terms of  statistics,
and more specifically in terms of  the normal curve. Foucault’s central
example of  normalization is expressed in his account of  the
development of  what might be called a proto-statistical epidemiology.36
He describes the nineteenth-century development of  the increasingly
refined applications of  the techniques of  the normal curve to medical
data on disease incidence.
First, there is the creation of  the continuity of  a population
by means of  statistics.37 That is, sick and well are joined in a single
population unit; they are not ontologically segregated. From this, a
normal curve of  morbidity or mortality is produced.
The population is a set of  elements inside of  which one
can note constants and regularities even down to the [level
of] accidents, and inside of  which one can locate the
universal of  desire that regularly produces the benefit of
all, and relative to which one can discover a certain number
of  variables upon which this benefit depends, and that
are capable of modifying it.38
It is the constitution of  the population as a natural entity that Foucault
identifies as a pivotal move in the conceptual transition from human
kind (genre humain) to species, and hence in the biologization of  human
beings, of  their insertion into a common epistemological field with all
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living species. The notion of  population lodged human beings firmly
in among “other living beings.”39
Second, Foucault describes the “interplay of  differential
normalities” that operates in the kind of  normalization that characterizes
regulatory control. For example, the statistical analyses will generate
normal distributions for syphilis by cases infected and for deaths from
syphilis, as well as for syphilis deaths for each age, region, town, quarter,
and profession. The technique then will be to attempt to reduce all of
the most deviant of  these normal curves to the level of  the general
normal distribution of  mortality. This is the “interplay of  differential
normalities.” So, here Foucault specifies that this “normalization” “in
the strict sense” occurs in a manner nearly the reverse of  that of  the
disciplinary sort of  normalization, or normation.40 What is reversed? In
the case of  this normalization in the strict sense, or normalisation, the
identification of  normal and abnormal precedes the identification of  the
norm. The various normal curves are collected and compared. Then,
“certain distributions” are “considered more normal than others, or in any
case more advantageous than the others. It is these distributions that
will serve as norms. The norm is an interplay [un jeu] within differential
normalities.”41 Hence, for Foucault, a norm in the strict sense is set by
means of  this comparative study of  normalities found in normal
distributions.
Measurement and social mereology
The Belgian astronomer Adolphe Quetelet is credited with
first applying the Gaussian error curve, or “Bell Curve,” to social objects
in his 1835 book, Sur l’homme et le développement de ses facultés, ou Essai de
physique sociale.42 Astronomers had devised the method of  taking multiple
measures of  planetary positions and, finding that those numbers formed
the characteristic bell-shaped distribution, using the mean of  that
distribution for prediction of  planetary position. Despite the imprecision
of  astronomical measurement, then, the “Bell Curve” or “normal
distribution,” was used to determine reliable results. When multiple
measurements were taken they were discovered to cluster around a
central value; this mean of  the distribution was used as a way of  canceling
out measures that were presumed to be erroneous, but not able to be
specifically identified as such. The values farther away from the mean
value were the lesser reliable measurements. The mean of  the normal
distribution, then, stands in for the accurate measurement that is sought
but is technologically unachievable.
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It was Quetelet who extended this practice of  corrective
measurement from astronomical to social objects. This extension of
the mathematical law of  error to social objects ushers in the 19th century
era of  “social arithmetics,” “social mathematics” and “social physics”
and thus marks the advent of  what becomes quantitative sociology. It
is the frequent occurrence of  the normal distribution in the growing
nineteenth century collection of  social data that prompts Quetelet to
make this extension of  the Gaussian error law from astronomical to
social objects. He supposed that the mean of  the normal distribution
in the case of  the social object should have the same kind of  error-
canceling accuracy as the mean in the case of the astronomical object.
Quetelet is also the source of  the notion of  the average man,
the statistical composite of a panoply of measurements of features of
groups of  men; the sum of  the means of  the height, weight, intelligence
and other moral features of  a group would paint a mathematical portrait
of  the average man. Theodore M. Porter discusses the intellectual career
of  Adolphe Quetelet’s notion of  l’homme moyen and its adoption and
extension by Henry Thomas Buckle in the latter’s History of  Civilization
in England.43 Along one of  its tributaries, the descent of  the notion
proceeds from Adolphe Quetelet to Buckle to John Stuart Mill.44
According to Porter, Quetelet, Buckle and Mill were impressed by the
relative reliability of  statistical knowledge about collections or groups
compared to the much more precarious knowledge of  individuals.
Porter explains the great appeal to nineteenth century thinkers of  the
advances in mathematical statistics and their application to social
problems:
Quetelet and Buckle were read, moreover, by a generation of
Europeans who were imbued with a sense of society as a
fundamental and preeminently historical entity that was capable
of  having its own laws. Statistics acquainted these readers
with a new form in which natural laws could reveal themselves,
one whose distinctive features were noted by writer after writer.
The individuals are so numerous, and subject to so complex
an array of  circumstances, that it is impossible to foresee with
any reliability their future behavior. Yet whenever a large
number of  individuals is considered at once, “the influence
of contingencies seems to disappear before that of general
laws.”45
We can summarize the thought that exerted such attraction with Porter’s
line that itself  quotes from Mill’s A System of  Logic: “statesmen may rely
on probable statements regarding multitudes, for ‘what is true
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approximately of  all individuals is true absolutely of  all masses’.”46 This
thought invites a number of  speculations on the ontological
presuppositions of  statistical laws in their application to social questions.
To speculate, then: It seems there is an obscured, curious and
powerful assumption operating in this thought. This assumption is
that the trait that either is an individual or is attributed to an individual
is the same sort of  trait, or is sufficiently the same, as the trait attributed
to the group or collection of  individuals.
Insufficient attention is generally paid to a change of  sense
that occurs in some uses of  the notion of  an average with respect to a
property that is the object of  measure and comparison. In contemporary
popularizations of  social statistical results, we can often identify a
multiphase movement from:
(i) Individual measurement: data collection of  individual
measurements of  a selected property of  individuals to
(ii) Aggregation of  individual measurements: these individual
measurements are tabulated together to
(iii) (a) Mean of  the measurements: the average derived from
the aggregation of  individual measurements and said to
be a property of  the group of  individuals to
(iii) (b) Rational redistribution of  the results of  aggregation and
averaging: a frequentist interpretation of  that group
property that lends it back to individual members of  the
group, in the form of  calculated likelihoods, or risks,
expressed as ratios or rates, or
(iv) Generalization of  the results: extension of  results from
the group understood as a representative sample of  a larger
population to that larger population or to its member
individuals.
The first three of  these moves concern us for the moment. It
seems that in such a triphase movement, a shift in kind of  measurement
takes place in the move from individual (i) to aggregated (iii)
measurement. Further, this transition can be described as one in which
the sense of  the property at issue itself  must be considered changed
for the reason that it applies to a significantly different kind of being in
the group (iii) than in the individual (i). That is, the property applied to
the individual is not the same as the property applied, by averaging and
ratio-construction, to the group.47
II. The case of  suicide
To see this, we might consider the case of  suicide. Porter notes
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that the objects of  statistical regularities that so captivated nineteenth
century thinkers were “murder, suicide, the misaddressing of  letters.”48
This was because of  the great constancy in the rates of  these phenomena
for specified societies. Though individual persons in a society appear
to act in voluntary but unconcerted and irregular ways, the collective
facts about the behavior of  those same individuals taken as a total
group are regular and constant. For nineteenth century thinkers, the
stability of  the mean implied a supporting substructure of  social law;
statistical regularities implied the existence of  general laws governing
society. “Crimes occur in the same numbers year after year, obeying
ostensible social laws…”49
With respect to suicide, then, we can distinguish three
important cases. We omit consideration of  the average or (iii A), for
the moment, although the same point can be made about the average
as about the ratio, when we realize that an average can also be expressed
as a ratio, namely, the ratio of  the sum of  a set of  values to the cardinal
number of  those values. Accordingly: (i) an individual can be a suicide,
and (ii) a society composed of  individuals, some of  whom are suicides,
can have a total figure for the quantity of  individual suicides; and (iii B)
the society can have a ratio of  suicides to non-suicides or a suicide rate.
Often, this societal probability or proneness to suicide is re-distributed
to individual members of  society; that is, it is thought to convey
information of  some import for not just the social body as a whole but
for its individual members. And (iv): This ratio or rate can then be
interpreted in a probabilistic sense such that a society can be said to be
more or less likely to contain individual suicides (the notion of  risk).
So, with respect to the society, the two relevant figures are: (ii),
a figure for the quantity or absolute number of  individual suicides for
a given society, on the one hand, and (iii B), a figure for the suicide rate
of  a given society, on the other hand.  The first is a figure each unit of
which refers to and characterizes individual members of  a society. The
second figure is essentially a ratio of suicides to non-suicides for the
total population capable of  suicide. The first figure expresses the cardinal
or integral property of  a group, namely, the group of  all individuals
who are suicides. The second figure expresses a rational property of  a
greater and different group, namely, the aggregate of  suicides and non-
suicides.50
The relevant—and questionable—assumption here is that the
term ‘suicide’ retains the same sense in its role in these two figures. The
second use of  the term ‘suicide’ applies to the group of  only suicides.
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The third use of  the term applies to the compound group of  suicides
and non-suicides, expressing, in fact, an asserted relation between them
in the language of  ratios. But we can wonder whether the differences
between the scope ((i) single individual, (ii) group of  suicides, (iii) total
possible suicides) of  the term’s reference might make a difference for
its sense. And if  it does, we can inquire into the precise relation of
those senses to each other, and of  those objects to each other. The
term ‘suicide’ when applied to an individual [(i)] or to a group of
individuals [(ii)] refers to actual persons who have committed suicide.51
(And it is a term or a figure that refers to the past.) The term “suicide”
in the expression “suicide rate” no longer refers to any person or persons,
but to a relation between numbers or quantities alone. There is no
more a “suicide” rate, average or norm than there is an average “height”
of  a group of  persons each of  which has a height. Of  course, there are
rates, averages or norms of  numbers or quantities in relation to each
other, but these are not rates “of suicide” or averages “of heights,” they
are rates and averages of numbers and quantities.
The objection advanced here is that the term applied to a
society in the figure of  a suicide rate or ratio [(iii B)], no longer refers to
the same genera of  object as does its source term (“suicide”), that is, to
an individual or even to a group of  individuals. Rather, it refers to a
quantitative relation between two measures associated with groups.
The move from individual to rate, by way of  the group, amounts to a
radical shift of  ontological register. This ontological slide—from a single
‘case’ of  suicide to a total figure for the group of  all ‘cases’ of  suicide
to the numerical expression of  the relation between two groups, the
group of  actual suicides and the group of  possible suicides, one of
which contains the other—is significant.
One might locate its chief  significance in the move from
individual to the figure for total suicides, that is, from (i) to (ii). In that
case, one might stress a leap from non-quantitative to quantitative
description, or perhaps from singular to plural enumeration or
description. Let us rather indicate the significance of the slide that
occurs between (ii) and (iii B), that is, a slide from integral to rational
numerical expression. For, the figure for (ii), the total number of  suicides,
is an integer not expressed as a rational number. But the figure for (iii
B), the suicide rate, is a rational number. The first of  these two figures
assigns an absolute quantity to a group of  individual members joined
and homogenized by the bureaucratic, medical, police and social
scientific application of  a definition of  suicide. The second of  the two
FOUCAULT AND SOCIAL MEASURE
17
figures assigns a proportional quantity between two figures of  the first
sort, namely, the group of  suicides and the group of  all social members
capable of  suicide. The paper’s claim here is that these two types of
figures treat two different ontological orders. The first is of  the order
of  groups, the second is of  the order of  relations between groups.52
Average, mean and norm
Typically, contemporary statistical uses of  such rates deploy a
probabilistic interpretation of  the relative frequencies expressed in such
rates, and then re-apply or distribute these frequencies to all individuals
in the total group studied, as well as to each individual in the total
group. In the average, the standardized feature of  the subgroup (here,
suicides) is distributed over the total group (the whole society, or actual
suicides plus potential suicides) to give a suicide likelihood or risk for
any random member of  the total group. This mathematical sharing-
out or allotment of  the likelihood or risk has historically implied a
correlative political sharing of  a hazard constructed as a quantity that is
evenly distributable over the entirety of  the total group. The average
equalizes by distributing evenly.
In the average distributed back over the society and shared
out to its members, we find the occlusion of  the relation between the
groups [(ii)] that go to compose the figure of  the rate. In this case,
suicide rates express the relation between several groups. Depending
on the kind of  rate, these groups will be the set of  actual suicides, the
set of  possible suicides, and the set that is the union of  these. But the
average distributed back over the society and shared out to its members
is the likelihood of  suicide for the individual member of  society. It is
this distribution of  the ratio back to the individual elements of  the
grouping in the form of  likelihoods that occludes the rational nature of
the rate. In other words, it conceals the fact that here it is a matter of
the relation between the relevant groups.
Moreover, in sharing out the relation between the relevant
groups to each member and to all members of  the society, the spectral
nature of  the set of  suicides is given new and continuing life. The set
of suicides is spectral because it denotes a collection of the dead; its
members are no longer, at least when compared to the potential suicides
that comprise the denominator in the ratio of actual suicides to potential
suicides. But the suicide rate distributed over the remaining individuals
legates to each a vital parcel of  the set of  actual suicides; they leave
behind the risk of resembling them.
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If  we think that the sense of  the term ‘suicide’ remains
significantly unchanged in the cases noted, we are deceived by the
cooperative power of  the grammar of  adjunction and the arithmetic
of  averages. The specifically ontological shift indicated here is significant
because the adjectival and arithmetic assimilation effected in these kinds
of  cases does the conceptual labor of  homogenization that is
subsequently found in discourses of social and political comparability
in the form of  claims purported to be merely and innocently descriptive
and representative ones.
So, aside from the oft-noted problem of  actually crafting the
definitions under which observed phenomena will be classed (the
problem of  determining what counts as measurable qualities), and the
problem of  the norm’s equivocal descriptive or prescriptive status, there
is also the problem of  the sort of  overlooked equivocations on the
ontological or conceptual ‘level’ identified here. Crucially, the shift from
the integral numerical expression found in (ii) to the rational numerical
expression of  (iii) is a shift from one ontological register to another.
If  this claim about a shift in ontological register is accepted,
the oft-obscured workings of  the novel kind of  comparability that
emerges with the widespread use of  social statistics can be seen with
greater clarity. It is the mathematical continuity of  the number line, or
an assumption of  continuous quantity, that is the crucial medium for
the creation of  the social continuities that guarantee the modern form
of  social comparability that Foucault identifies as characteristic of
biopower. For it creates the “equality-with” compassed in the etymology
of  the verb “to compare” such that ontological differences and
discontinuities between individuals, groups, and relations between
groups are homogenized without notice. It is the continuity of  number
itself  that renders both the individuals counted and the ratio of  group
to group comparable objects to which basic and sophisticated
mathematical operations can be applied. Statistical ratios express social
relations in a concealed manner and create abstract relations through
the comparability generated by numerical continuity; social
discontinuities are homogenized in the continuity of  quantum.
Many more qualifications could be added to this account. Space
permitting, we could in a more refined account explore the fact that
strictly speaking the continuity of  number in statistics predates the
invention of  the statistical norm. Desrosières’ work on the emergence
of  German Statistik and English “political arithmetic” is particularly
illuminating about this history. For he discusses the many changes in
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statistical representation and aim beginning with the use of  descriptive
statistical tables, in which, for example, states compiled data in columns
and rows. In German descriptive statistics, a column of  states was
listed, as well as descriptive entries for various categories of  state interest,
also arranged in columns. One could then read across a line for a
summary of  a single state’s profile, or down a column to compare all
the listed states in a particular category. The entries in this kind of
descriptive statistical table were not figures but words. Desrosières traces
the transitions from this sort of  statistics to a quantitative two-
dimensional “crossed table” system. He holds that it was through reading
down a column of  this sort of  table that the notion of  a “variable”
appeared. So, plainly, a kind of  comparability exists in such tables. In
the second stage, though, verbal descriptions are replaced by numbers,
and we have the emergence of  a specifically quantitative, two-
dimensional “space of  comparability.”53
Part of  the novelty of  the statistical norm, then, is that by
contrast to this two-dimensional table it is a multidimensional space of
comparison, and as such it crafts a “multidimensional continuum.”54
The normal distribution is a highly elaborate tool for the presentation
and coordination of  multiple quantitative relations. It is the conceptual
complexity of  the normal distribution that has prompted restriction
of the discussion so far to its simpler composite notions of ratio and
average. In the novel technology of  the normal curve, subgroups of  a
total group are determined to be subgroups by reference to the mean
of  the total group. Of  course, the distribution itself  may be made on
the basis of  a single factor or feature, that is, it may be one-dimensional
in this factorial sense.  But the distribution permits comparisons of
subgroups to each other and to the mean, as well as comparisons of
individuals or individual values anywhere on the curve with any other
individuals in the total group. The individual is characterized multi-
dimensionally: it is situated relative to the relation of  any other individual
to the mean, and not simply or directly relative to any other individual.
And the mean is allegedly a feature of  the total group. So, the individual
is characterized relative to a feature attributed to the group of  which it
is a part, namely, the mean value of  the total group. The individual is
characterized relative to a general feature of  the total group, while this
general feature is partially derived from the value of  any given individual
value, since it is the mean of  all the individual values aggregated. The
most common value, then, becomes the point of  reference for the
location of  every value that is represented. The complexity of  the
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multidimensional space of  comparability found in the instrument of
the statistical distribution known as the normal curve thus permits
multiple kinds of  comparisons through the intermediary of  the mean
of  the curve.
One argument of this section has been that the statistical mean
does not characterize the group, it characterizes the arithmetic relations
of  the measures of  the group. This is a controversial claim and one
that is at the heart of  continuing debates about the validity of  social
statistics. This controversy attended the emergence of  these techniques
with Quetelet’s invention of  the average man. Quetelet, as Hacking
puts it:
transformed the theory of  measuring unknown physical
quantities, with a definite probable error, into the theory
of  measuring ideal or abstract properties of  a population.
Because these could be subjected to the same formal techniques, they
became real quantities.55
Hence, it is the properties endogenous to mathematical objects—
continuous quantity, the basic laws and operations of  arithmetic—that
create the alleged comparability and continuities of  populations and
other social phenomena constituted as the objects of  social statistics.
The conceptual sleight that performs this conversion seems today still
to pass undetected.
Endpoints
With respect to the approach of  this paper to Foucault’s
thought, one might wonder about the relation between the conceptual
and non-discursive dimensions of  his work. About this matter, it should
be noted that the present focus on the conceptual source of  the social
continuities of  the era of  biopower is not made at the expense of  the
import of  Foucault’s careful historical analyses of  the role of  non-
discursive elements in the creation of  social continuities. For, on his
view, these elements themselves come to be ordered, shaped and co-
ordinated in large part on the basis of  this novel technology that is the
norm. The ubiquitous application of  the normal curve as a means of
social management is itself  constitutive of  those regulatory controls
that Foucault claims take species, populations and races as their objects.
This paper has sought to draw from Foucault’s work an
implicit reason for which he can claim that modern biopower is a
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“continuous” form of  power: it creates social continuities on the
basis of  politically-instituted mathematical continuities through the
immense apparatuses of  linked regulatory institutions and practices
that employ statistical tools. When expressed as ratios, actual social
relations between groups of  people are masked in these figural
expressions that employ the specific features of  mathematical
objects to characterize people and groups of  people. We might say
that the normal curve in social statistics is a pseudo-relation to
others that is in its essence a detour through the numerical
amalgamation of  all—a ligature so ontologically alien to the social
world that it fails to quality as a relation at all. The conceptually
duplicitous statistical reason that comes to order life in modernity
is, as Foucault never ceases to argue, a creation of  the new
conjunction of  power and knowledge that installs a novel,
specifically statistical form of  social continuity and comparability.
It is on the basis of  this insight that we can conceive the specificity
and the force of  Foucault’s account of  modern biopower.
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